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The Governance Capacities of Brexit from a Scottish Perspective: The 
Case of Fisheries Policy 
 
Abstract 
Brexit leads to uncertainties about how policies will be ‘rescaled’ from the European Union 
back to the UK and its devolved governments. Interviews with key Scottish Government 
officials show how the UK’s withdrawal from the Common Fisheries Policy presents mixed 
challenges for the Scottish policy system to absorb policy change at analytical, 
administrative, political, and communicative levels. Our analysis finds that absorbable areas 
concern fisheries management, operations, and analysis.  Yet there are capacity areas that 
will require greater investment at political, communicative and relational levels. This article 
makes an important contribution to research on the multi-level governance capacities for 
accommodating Brexit in UK policy-making. In doing so, our contribution applies the 
governance capacities literature to a new field of scholarship around Brexit studies. 
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Introduction 
The UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has brought the issue of governmental 
capacities into sharp focus. Capacities are fundamental to the maintenance of governmental 
business (Matthews, 2011; Lodge and Wegrich; Egeberg and Trondal, 2018; El-Taliawi and 
Zeger Van Der Wal, 2019). They matter for public policy and administration because 
‘having a capable public sector that is that is able to optimally align resources with actions 
and actually implement designed policies, is … a crucial factor in any state’s quality of 
government’ (El-Taliawi and Zeger Van Der Wal, 2019: 2). Over the last few decades UK 
governance has been marked by Europeanisation and hollowing out processes, which have 
gradually eroded the centre’s capacities in policy-making (e.g. Knill et al., 2001; Connolly, 
2014). The context of austerity since 2010 has seen the size of the UK civil service reduce 
and the governance challenges posed by Brexit raise further questions about governmental 
capacities. Recent research focussing on the impact of Brexit on environmental policy found 
capacity to be a key variable insofar as a lack of capacity restricts the UK’s ability to diverge 
from EU policy in the short term (Burns et al., 2019). Further complications emerge by the 
fact that post-Brexit capacities challenge many competencies that are formally devolved, 
meaning capacities will need to be developed across multiple levels of governance. 
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The central question that underpins this article is: What are the implications of Brexit for the 
governance capacities of Scottish fisheries from a devolved perspective? We address this 
post-Brexit capacities question by examining the repatriation of fisheries policy. 
Specifically, it explores the governance capacities within one of the UK’s four fisheries 
administrations: Marine Scotland. Fisheries represents the ideal case to assess post-Brexit 
governance and capacities within the UK’s multi-level setting. First, fisheries policy is an 
exclusive EU competence so it has been subject to significant Europeanisation and much of 
the existing policy-making capacities are located at the EU level. Second, although being 
relatively small in the context of the UK’s overall economy, fisheries was politicised during 
the referendum campaign. High expectations have been set regarding the future of fisheries 
governance once the UK leaves the EU. Third, fisheries policy is a formally devolved 
competence, but cannot operate in isolation from other competencies reserved by the UK 
government, including international relations and international trade. This highlights the 
importance of developing multi-level governance capacities. 
 
The article makes distinct contributions to hitherto disconnected streams of literature. From 
a public policy and administration perspective, it offers an applied empirical application of 
capacities in contemporary governance. Our approach, therefore, is to understand the applied 
aspects of capacities by formulating an analytical framework for making sense of multi-
layered capacities in the context of Brexit. Whereas existing research has focused 
predominantly on the policy uncertainties and a range of more political and democratic 
questions (see the following Brexit special issues: Wincott et al, 2017; Bailey and Budd, 
2019), this article offers an assessment surrounding the public administration and delivery 
of Brexit. In addition, the article contributes to a growing body of marine social science 
research by highlighting how issues of governance and public administration, such as 
capacities, are central to the delivery of fisheries and wider marine policies. In this way, the 
article fills an existing gap in fisheries policy research. Our argument, based on our findings, 
is that Brexit has brought to light the fact that capacity-types are dependent on each other 
within a multi-level governance environment. However, political capacities are the 
‘overarching’ capacities that require continual evaluation in the context of Brexit in order 
for other policy specific capacities to be developed. 
 
This article is structured as follows.  First, we discuss the research methods for our study. 
Second, an overview of Brexit and the UK governance of fisheries is provided in order to 
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contextualise our governance capacity framework for the case study analysis. This is 
followed by an empirical analysis of governance capacities. Overall, the article demonstrates 
how leaving the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (essentially what ‘post-Brexit’ means 
for the UK governance of fisheries) presents mixed challenges for the Scottish policy system 
to absorb capacities at various levels. 
 
Research methods 
The article is informed by six in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews with key 
Scottish Government officials within Marine Scotland. The policy remit of the respondents 
spanned intergovernmental relations, industry engagement, enforcement, scientific analysis, 
and strategic planning. Two interviewees had previous experience of working as part of 
negotiation teams in relation to EU quota allocations. The interviewees had technocratic 
expertise across key capacity domains.  The interviews took place in the office premises of 
Marine Scotland in Edinburgh. Marine Scotland is the civil service directorate within the 
Scottish Government responsible for leading the protection Scottish coastal waters and seas. 
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. 
 
A capacities framework, based on the analysis of the policy capacities literature, was used 
to undertake a thematic qualitative analysis of the interview data. The research adopts the 
case study method to investigate the case of UK fisheries governance to understand and 
interpret the perspectives of policy actors alongside key policy documentation. This 
approach allows us to deploy analytical themes (in this case capacity types) as blueprints to 
examine the qualitative data. 
 
The interviews produced extensive qualitative data and thick descriptions of contextual 
factors to explain the work, priorities and challenges of the governance of fisheries. The 
interview data were grouped into following themes: analytical capacities, administrative 
capacities and political capacities. Contextual governance was also used a broader theme, 
broken down into intergovernmental relations, stakeholder engagement and external 
relations as sub-themes and, where relevant, linked to the main non-contextual themes noted 
above. 
 
UK fisheries policy, Brexit and addressing gaps in the literature 
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Fisheries policy is a devolved competence and while it operated under an EU-wide 
framework through the CFP, it is the responsibility of the devolved administrations in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (and the UK central government in England) to 
implement. UK fisheries policy is a ‘stand out’ case for Brexit policy analysis given that 
92% of fishers voted to leave the EU (McAngus & Usherwood, 2016; McAngus, 2018). The 
policy challenges for the UK government, therefore, have gravitated around the need to 
develop an approach which addresses the concerns of those who voted to leave, balances the 
needs of the wider fisheries industry, and meets the government’s commitments in the 25 
year environment plan to deliver a ‘green Brexit’ (all while respecting the devolution 
settlement). As part of the withdrawal agreement, the UK government has agreed to a 
transition arrangement, which, means the UK will align with the CFP (and therefore 
including the quota system) until the end of 2020, in part to provide the UK with the space 
to develop its own fisheries policy. 
 
The UK Government’s Fisheries White Paper suggests that post-Brexit policy should be 
based on a UK-led governance approach via a ‘common framework’, whereby the devolved 
administrations have the autonomy to implement fisheries management approaches tailored 
to their own contexts while adhering to an overarching common approach (Defra, 2018, 11). 
Furthermore, while fisheries policy is devolved, key related areas such as formal 
international relations and trade negotiations are not. Consequently, the UK government will 
have to manage its relationships with the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales (Huggins et al 2018, 1). 
 
Several studies have addressed fisheries governance in the UK. For example, there have been 
studies which have explored the socio-economic impact of CFP reform on fishing 
communities (e.g. Brookfield et al, 2005) and studies across the disciplines of anthropology, 
social geography and sociology that have provided in-depth analysis of the social, cultural 
and gender dynamics at play in fishing communities across the world (e.g. Williams, 2008; 
Ross, 2013). Previous research has also considered the empowerment of fisheries 
communities (e.g. Acheson, 1981; Urquhart and Acott, 2014). However, questions about 
governance capacities have yet to receive sufficient attention. It is important to address this 
because the realignment of policy competences resulting from Brexit stimulate debates about 
the extent and mechanisms by which competences are (re)distributed which, in turn, lead to 
further questions about the organisational and policy capacities to absorb change. The task 
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of reforming institutional arrangements is, in no small part, about identifying the areas where 
capacities need to be developed in light of shifts in policy responsibilities. 
 
The literature on organisational political capacities provides important analytical lenses for 
understanding the capacities requiring development and the challenges of doing so (Dunlop, 
2015; Wu et al, 2015). Farazmand (2009, 1016) notes that ‘nothing gets done without 
administrative capacity’ and that capacity is the ‘core of government’. In public 
administration terms, capacities are the institutional energy which, if managed properly, play 
a necessary part avoiding policy failure (Dunlop, 2017; Howlett 2012). 
 
This case study is frontloaded by a three-pillared framework: analytical, 
bureaucratic/adaptive, political/relational, focusing mainly on Scotland. Most of the UK’s 
fishing activity is located in Scotland and, consequently, Scottish institutions face a wide 
range of capacity challenges arising from the repatriation of fisheries policy.   
 
Governance capacities: A framework for analysis  
Studies of institutionalism show that periods of stability, which are then punctuated by path 
altering critical junctures (e.g. March and Olsen, 1989; Streeck and Thelen, 2005), result in 
public services needing to implement adaptive strategies for renewing pre-existing 
arrangements and organisational behaviours. In such circumstances, policy-makers need to 
understand the limitations in which established bureaucratic patterns impact on institutions 
and their capacities to absorb change. The literature on capacities in the public policy and 
administration discipline provide variations on the theme of the competencies and 
capabilities (e.g. Dunleavy and Hood, 1994; Farazmand, 2009; Head, 2013; Lodge and 
Wegrich, 2014; Wu et al, 2015; Newman et al 2017), but gravitates around a series of 
capacities types categorised as the following: 
 
Analytical capacities: Public agencies require the ability to access and apply 
scientific and technical knowledge, including the analytical techniques and 
approaches for identifying data and evidence to shape decision-making (Head, 2013, 
401; Wu et al, 2015, 168-169). This is based on the need to make sense of public 
understandings of what policy priorities should be as well as engaging with 
stakeholders in order to inform decision-making processes (Dunlop, 2015; 2017). 
This type also includes capacities for monitoring and evaluating scientific data (e.g. 
6 
 
through compliance and performance measurement-based activities), and having the 
appropriate institutional structures and personnel in place for managing these 
functions to inform policy formulation and implementation processes. Such 
capacities are generally held internally within government but can also be ‘imported’ 
via external epistemic actors.  
 
Bureaucratic/administrative capacities:  This refers to key structural, informational 
organisational, managerial aspects including functions of an administrative nature 
e.g. levels of staffing, resource management, financial, and training (Farazmand, 
2009, 1017; Wu et al, 2015, 169; Dunlop, 2015, 267; Dunlop, 2017, 27). Moreover, 
this includes the systems to facilitate organisational partnership-working and 
collaboration, both internally across bureaucratic structures and externally between 
agencies within areas in which organisations have direct influence. There are, 
however, links between analytical and bureaucratic capacities in public 
administration given that neither capacity type is likely be effective in feeding into 
policy decision-making on their own (Head, 2013; Newman, 2017). 
 
Political capacities: Dunlop (2017, 32) notes that ‘communicative capacity concerns 
the capacity to develop and maintain a policy paradigm that commands approval and 
legitimacy in wider society’. The ability to shape multi-level political outcomes 
depends on the institution or agency having political reflexivity to navigate and 
negotiate policy terrains in order to anticipate events and to influence political 
outcomes (Farazmand, 2009, 1016; Dunlop, 2015, 266; Wu et al, 2015, 169-170). 
The capacities to scrutinise legislation within parliamentary settings becomes 
important in this context. Inextricably linked to political capacities are also relational 
capacities. Relational capacities refer to resourcing policy efforts to politically 
navigate multi-level relations, including manoeuvring through intergovernmental 
channels. For example, international policy negotiations that might once have been 
undertaken with the EU institutions will change the channels in which such 
deliberations take place. This places the government departments responsible for a 
number of policy areas (e.g. trade, health security, economic policy) in a position 
whereby they need to develop strategies for engaging with other international 
organisations in order to negotiate through different policy spaces. In this respect, 
relational capacities also refer to the levels of agility that an organisation, or a unit 
7 
 
within an organisation, has when it comes to drawing in, and cutting loose, actors 
involved in decision-making processes e.g. the use of stakeholder groups (such as 
industry) by government in the processes of policy formulation. This links with 
communicative capacities given that communicating the risks of different policy 
options is a political process. 
 
In short, devolved administrations in the post-Brexit context need to review their capacities 
for taking on more direct relational engagement (as well as their other capacities). They will 
need to engage more directly with international authorities and participate in negotiations 
for areas that affect the devolution of policy responsibilities.  
The next section of the article contextualises addresses fisheries policy more specifically in 
the context of Brexit. 
 
Fisheries policy in the context of Brexit  
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU represents the most significant governance change that 
the fisheries industry has ever seen. Although the fishing industry represents a very modest 
part of the UK’s economy (around 0.05% of GVA), it is deeply important for many coastal 
communities as it is part of cultural identities (McAngus et al, 2018a). In Scotland, the 
fishing industry is a significant employer across the catching, processing and aquaculture 
sectors. This is multiplied by the secondary employment relating to the sector, including ship 
repair, equipment supplies, marketing and transport (Royal Society, 2004). While Scottish 
vessels only account for 34% of the UK fishing fleet, they represent 55% of total UK vessel 
capacity (Marine Management Organisation 2018). 
 
Brexit means that the UK, and its devolved administrations, must develop governance 
arrangements and a future vision for the industry. In doing so, the UK government needs to 
balance the interests of the catching sector and ensure the sustainability of fisheries, in 
addition to meeting obligations to neighbouring coastal states under the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  One of the reasons why the catching sector largely 
supported Brexit was because of the unpopularity of the EU’s CFP – there was the perception 
that the policy had damaged the industry and local communities traditionally dependent on 
fishing. The catching sector generally seek more control over the seas and, at the same time, 
have been dissatisfied with the quota system that underpins the CFP. Yet those catching 
shellfish species, which are not subject to EU quotas, are more concerned about the impact 
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of non-tariff barriers on fresh exports, given most of the catch is exported to the EU. The 
seafood processing sector is similarly concerned about market access, the potential for high 
tariffs on processed seafood and any barriers that might impact on the transportation and 
quality of products if the UK is no longer part of the Single Market and Customs Union (see 
House of Commons (2018) for a balanced overview of the key issues). 
 
The politics of fisheries is such that the industry felt that they have been ‘sold out’ and ‘let 
down’ (BBC, 2018) by the UK government’s agreement following the referendum agree a 
transition arrangement with the EU (and essentially stay in the CFP) until 2020. In Scotland, 
where increased powers for the governance of fisheries are likely to reside post-Brexit, 62% 
of Scottish people maintain that Scotland should have policy competence over fisheries post-
Brexit (Curtice, 2018), yet 80% of Scottish fishers tend not to trust the Scottish Government 
(McAngus, 2018). This can be partly explained by the fact that Conservative leaning fishers 
in Scotland tend to disapprove of the SNP-led Scottish Government’s position of being anti-
Brexit (and thus being more comfortable with remaining in the CFP). After the transition 
period the UK will have full sovereignty over its waters, known as its Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) (see Figure 1), and would enter talks with other coastal states in order to discuss 
reciprocal access to stocks in each other’s EEZs. 
 
Figure 1: UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
 
[insert Figure 1] 
 
 
 
Source: Flanders Marine Institute (2019) and UK Hydrographic Office (2019) 
 
The UK government has proposed that the post-Brexit context ‘will respect the devolution 
settlements and maximise all Fisheries Administrations’ power to manage their fisheries 
while, where necessary, maintaining the overall coherence of the UK’s fisheries policy, 
particularly to ensure compliance with international obligations’ (Defra, 2018, 11). 
However, this remains a matter of significant debate between the Scottish and UK 
administrations given UK government’s overall position on Clause 11 of the EU Withdrawal 
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Bill (which subsequently received Royal Assent on 26th June 2018). Originally, the principle 
underpinning the EU Withdrawal legislation was that the control of areas where EU and 
devolved law overlap would pass by default to the devolved administrations. However, the 
UK government amended their position on this to allow UK ministers to make regulations 
in order to block the ability of the devolved administrations to change the law in specified 
areas – including fisheries (Institute for Government, 2018). The UK Government felt it was 
necessary to ensure common frameworks in order to avoid internal policy differentiation and 
potential unfair competition. The amendment to the clause means the UK government would 
retain control until agreement is reached about what to put in place of EU law. The EU 
Withdrawal Act did not receive Scottish parliamentary consent given that the Scottish 
Government’s position that the Act threatens the Sewel convention (i.e. that Westminster 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent 
of the Scottish parliament).  Moreover, the Scottish Government regarded the Act to be 
unacceptable for the devolution settlement given that the Scottish electorate voted 
overwhelmingly to remain within the EU (BBC, 2016).  The Welsh Assembly gave consent 
to the Act and the devolved administration in Northern Ireland was only starting to sit again 
after a period of suspension in early 2020. 
 
The UK Government presented its Fisheries Bill to Parliament in January 2020 (with an 
earlier Fisheries Bill having been presented in late 2018, but falling when Parliament was 
prorogued for the December 2019 General Election). The Fisheries Bill is rather vague on 
the issue of UK-devolved relationships after Brexit. However, the Bill does contain a 
proposal whereby ‘joint fisheries statements’ would be made, assumedly, by devolved and 
UK ministers which would act as statements of agreement between the different levels on 
matters of fisheries policy. The detail on how these would work in practice is not yet known, 
and there is a clear move by the UK Government to leave as much ambiguity on this matter 
as possible in order to allow for more concrete relationships to develop once Common 
Frameworks have been agreed. 
 
The CFP has four main policy areas: 
 
- Fisheries management – ensuring the long-term viability of fish stocks like cod, tuna, 
and prawns in EU waters. 
10 
 
- International policy and co-operation – working with non-EU countries and 
international organisations to manage shared fisheries, including Norway, Iceland, 
and the Faroe Islands. 
- Market and trade policy – creating fair competition in the market and setting 
standards on seafood products sold within the EU to protect consumers, such as 
requirements for clear product labels. 
- Funding – money to support the fishing industry transitioning to more sustainable 
fishing practices and assist coastal communities in diversifying their economies. The 
UK has chosen to spend €19.3m of its EU funding on improving sustainability in the 
sector during 2014-2020 
(Institute for Government, 2018) 
 
The proposed UK common framework will not just have a bearing on operational 
governance of fisheries but also the ramping up of policy activities that will be necessary for 
‘the UK to negotiate, enter into and implement new trade arrangements and international 
treaties’ (Defra, 2018). There has been broad agreement from the UK government and the 
devolved administrations on the need for some form of common framework for post-Brexit 
fisheries policy, but the Scottish Government’s position has been the need for the UK 
government to both respect and understand the devolution settlement. However, a senior 
official in Marine Scotland noted that: 
  
Our big concern under the way the withdrawal Bill is constructed is that 
essentially control over fisheries goes back to Westminster…If you talk to 
DEFRA, they don't see it like that, possibly ‘cause they're panicking but 
also there's such a lack of understanding of the devolution settlement. For 
example people talk about devolution of justice.  Justice was never, you 
know, the legal system was never combined, that was very clear.  And 
actually fisheries, it’s really interesting looking at it, you've got that 1882 
Fisheries Board Act…So if you respect the devolution settlement, it's very 
clear in the devolution settlement fisheries is fully devolved issues, 
Scotland manages fisheries within the Scottish zone, that's 200 miles, and 
Scottish vessels where they fish.  There are a few reserved aspects, the 
allocation of quota and international negotiations.         
         (MS Interview A, 2018) 
 
Another interviewee noted that ‘if policy was being designed in Westminster it feels a bit 
like the tail wagging the dog from a Scottish perspective’ (MS Interview, B, 2018). 
Nevertheless, Brexit will mean the UK assuming its responsibilities as an independent 
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coastal state, with decision-making and governance responsibility over fisheries policy 
returning to the UK alongside full control over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This 
will also have implications for the UK’s capacity for effectively navigating access points to 
EU-level decision-making processes in the aftermath of Brexit (McAngus et al, 2018b, 9). 
Expertise from Scottish governmental personnel at a policy and scientific level will need to 
play an increasing part in international policy engagement and negotiations. More broadly, 
as one senior Director at the Conference for Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR) noted 
in an interview, ‘the UK will need to develop activities in its own waters e.g. fleet capacity, 
infrastructure, aqua-culture, innovation. Many of these are covered by the CFP so the UK 
will need to define how they will go on their own and define an approach to UK fisheries 
policy’ (CPMR Interview, 2018). In this respect, the main policy driver affecting UK 
capacities is not being part of the CFP and the establishment of national policy arrangements 
via a common framework. The scope and composition of this is still under negotiation, but 
the framework is likely to require legislative and non-legislative arrangements, with the 
devolved administrations needing to address international and domestic matters (Defra, 
2018, 22). 
 
The next section of the article draws out what Brexit will mean for capacity types from the 
perspective of officials within the devolved administrations. 
 
Governance Capacities Post-Common Fisheries Policy: Research findings 
Further to the categories drawn from the public policy and administration literature earlier 
in this article, this section discusses the extent to which capacities will be absorbable or 
otherwise for the governance of fisheries post-CFP.  The data shows how capacity types are 
multi-layered. Although institutional change perspectives consider layering in the context of 
organisational functions (see Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Capano, 2019), the analyses of 
layering are less evident when it comes to understanding how macro-political changes (such 
as Brexit) lead to the recalibration of governance capacities. 
 
Analytical capacities 
Analytical capacities in fisheries governance encompass three main dimensions: scientific, 
monitoring and compliance, and innovation. Our interviews with Marine Scotland indicate 
that the need to develop analytical capacities is mixed across these areas. First, scientific 
capacities refer to how scientific data about types of fisheries stock levels serve to inform 
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policy discussions in relation to quotas and wider aspects to fisheries management and 
compliance. The scientific elements involve both the intelligence and evidence pertaining to 
the ways to manage stocks sustainability, which draws on wider research networks beyond 
government (e.g. with research institutes), and, furthermore, how science is incorporated 
within the work of policy teams within government. It also refers to the capacity of 
organisations to produce and supply the necessary data for international monitoring. In terms 
of the former, our research suggests that in Scottish public policy there are well developed 
research networks available to support the use of scientific evidence at the interface between 
research institutes and Marine Scotland.  For example, a senior official who works to engage 
with the research community on fisheries management noted that: 
 
I think we already do quite well with our scientific community up here, 
we have this mass network which Marine Scotland Science are plugged 
into and we work closely with SAMS in Oban, the marine institute there 
and with St Andrews, so we've already got pretty good connections and a 
good network of marine science in Scotland, I think we’re more joined up 
than most places.   
    (MS Interview E, 2018) 
 
This reflects longstanding institutional investment in building scientific relationships, given 
that fishing has been of enduring political importance to Scotland: 
 
I think Scotland has maintained the skill set and the expertise in the area 
because politically it is much higher up the food chain, and also Scotland 
generally I think with such a prevalent oil and gas industry and with a 
real focus on renewables, I think a lot of the research and expertise 
required to manage Scotland's seas are there. So I don’t think there's 
necessarily that deficit in the same way that you might find down south.   
     (MS Interview D, 2018) 
 
Nevertheless, interviewees felt that enhanced capacities for internal policy operations within 
Marine Scotland would be needed, particularly in terms of increasing the scientific 
representation within policy teams (who liaise and engage with UK government, the EU and 
other international bodies). The increased capacities required to enhance science within 
policy teams was not reported as being in need of fundamental reform but would need to be 
‘quite a bit bigger’ (MS Interview B, 2018) so that the organisation would need to respond 
to having more responsibility as a non-EU coastal state. The interviewee noted that ‘I’m not 
talking dozens of people but you'll have to ramp up on the basis of having five to seven 
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people within a scientist being embedded within the policy team, rather than interfacing with 
the team’ (MS Interview B, 2018). 
 
The infrastructure for monitoring the position of fishing vessels at sea, however, was not 
considered to be ‘new territory’. Interviewees generally agreed that the infrastructure and 
technology for monitoring does now warrant the need for increased capacities post-CFP but 
that it is the nature of new governance arrangements with the EU with the other coastal states 
would shape how monitoring takes place (MS Interview A, 2018).  The main reason why 
monitoring was cited as an area which can absorb changes in governance arrangements was 
due to the view that Scotland has shown its ability to innovate in terms of adapting the 
mechanisms by which data is gathered to support aspects of fisheries management. For 
instance, the Scottish Government, under the Cod Recovery Plan, which was a stakeholder-
led approach to ensure that North Sea cod was sustainable following threatened stock levels, 
‘pioneered the use of selective nets or real time closures to gain back additional effort, 
allowing to fish longer’ (MS interviewee, C). The interviewee also noted that Marine 
Scotland ‘pioneered cameras on boats within the EU for a while as part of the process’. 
Brexit would, however, change the ‘permission channels’ through which innovation takes 
place in the sense that the use of cameras on boats had to be negotiated with the EU but in 
future, ‘assuming we take the devolution settlement as it is, as written in the 1998 Act then 
we will be able to just get on and do that and we will be able to manage Scottish waters’ 
(MS Interview C, 2018). The fact that the UK will no longer be a member of the CFP will 
allow scope for more innovation out-with the extant regulatory framework. Examples of 
innovation highlighted by Marine Scotland include seeking to improve upon on aspects such 
as technical conservation and the construction of nets and mesh sizes (MS Interview C, 
2018). 
 
Bureaucratic/administrative capacities 
Administrative capacities in the fisheries policy sector refer to the structures of operational 
processes which concern the everyday management of fisheries, including access to, and the 
use of, resources. With this in mind, the dominant narrative to emerge from the interviews 
was that the structures of fisheries management will ‘evolve’. As one interviewee articulated 
it, ‘I don’t think it’s going to be root and branch changing of the way we do quota or anything 
like that necessarily, but we won’t be in the CFP’ (MS Interview A, 2018). The keenness of 
the interviewee to avoid indicating that administrative structures will be subject to anywhere 
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near paradigm-altering reform reflects the fact that it is unclear as to which parts of the CFP 
to retain, alter or reject in the post-Brexit context. This is on the basis that the CFP has 
represented the dominant governing framework for decades, plus budgetary constraints do 
not enhance the feasibility for substantial operational reconfigurations (MS Interview A, 
2018). This points to perhaps a realistic take on the propensity for administrative structures 
to change, which, as institutionalist scholars have noted, are slow and rarely radical but can 
be evolutionary with transformative results (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In terms of areas of 
administrative capacity that might require adaptation, Marine Scotland highlighted the 
importance of having more flexible arrangements to adapt to geographical contexts in 
Scotland and, moreover, in terms of reducing waste and discards (MS Interview A, 2018).  
 
It was noted earlier in the article that the UK Government’s Fisheries White Paper proposes 
a UK-led governance approach to fisheries policy via a common framework, with devolved 
administrations having the autonomy to implement fisheries management approaches that 
respects their own contexts (Defra, 2018, 11). The issue of common frameworks bring into 
question administrative capacities depending on what it ultimately means in practice and 
whether it will change existing intergovernmental arrangements for the management of 
quota, license holding and issuing catch certifications.  The UK Government, as the 
allocating authority for UK fish quotas, allocates UK fish quotas among the devolved 
administrations to the Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA) units associated with the licences 
administered by each devolved authority. The devolved administrations then allocate quota 
to its fishers, with the Scottish Government tending to allocate quota in line with the FQA 
approach (Scottish Government, 2018). If the common framework approach is adopted then 
it will require future evaluation, which will further impact on administrative capacities. Yet, 
the management of inspection, much of which is administered by the EU by virtue of the 
CFP, is subject to greater crystallisation in the minds of policy officials from a capacity point 
of view. The concerns of policy officials are mainly with regards to the inspection of illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing: 
 
Where we will have capacity issues is in relation to those things that we 
need not do now because we are a member of the EU, particularly in 
relation to IUU fishing, where at present EU vessels landing into EU ports, 
which is all of ours, don’t have to provide a catch certificate to show that 
they are a properly regulated vessel because they are what they are.  That 
is something which is potentially a significant burden on us in the future.  
15 
 
     (MS Interview A, 2018) 
 
More widely, concerns about ensuring that effective processes regarding IUU indicate the 
fact that, in policy terms, the devolved administrations have, under the devolution 
arrangement (which means that EU affairs are reserved to Westminster), less capacities for 
engagement in international negotiations. This links with the need to develop political 
capacities for international public policy activities once the UK is no longer a member of the 
CFP. Even if the UK reserves control of macro-level international policy engagement for 
UK fisheries, it is clear that such changes in policy responsibilities will likely have 
implications for the role of the devolved administrations in international negotiations.  This, 
therefore, calls into question the need to develop political capacities for such activities to 
take place. In this respect, there is a clear relationship between bureaucratic and political 
capacities in that the administrative space of Brexit governance disentanglement means that 
the Scottish Government needs to evaluate, consistently, whether the bureaucratic armoury 
is there to bolster the political capacities for effective national and international negotiations.   
 
Political capacities  
As noted earlier in the article, political capacities can include the capacities for parliamentary 
oversight. Officials indicated that they already have considerable experiences of committee 
appearances and that when international negotiations start ‘there might be a little bit more 
but I don’t think it will be huge’ (MS Interview B, 2018).  Rather, the main aspects of 
capacities by Scottish government officials refers to international policy engagement. The 
desire of Scottish government officials is to ensure that the Scottish share of quotas, as a 
non-EU coastal state, should be maximised, on the basis of committing to the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), which is a key aspect of the CFP1. An official noted that: 
 
We would seek to maximise the Scottish share in stocks of interest and 
maximise access to quota through coastal states arrangements if that’s how it 
transpires. But as we said in the meeting we just had, we do that firmly within 
the context of a commitment to MSY and harvesting the idea, we have been 
for some time and continue to be wholly committed to pursuing MSY within 
the context of socioeconomic pressures, but these are stocks of economic 
priority to us.  
 (MS Interview B, 2018) 
 
                                                            
1 MSY refers to the maximum catch permitted whilst ensuring the long-term sustainability of fish species 
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The politics of this requires the resilience and adaptive capacities for developing and 
managing international relationships. It is clear that there will be network complexities to 
operate through, both for the UK and for the devolved administrations. This is due to the fact 
that international representation on fisheries policy is led by the EU, where the UK is 
represented. An ‘international rescaling’ of policy networks as a result of Brexit are likely 
to produce a greater direct involvement of Scottish Government with  international fisheries 
organisations (such as the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission and the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation). The UK’s engagement with them to achieve their policy 
goals in fisheries will have implications for how, and in what ways, the UK government and 
the devolved administrations come together to set policy agendas. This will have 
implications for UK intergovernmental politics in reaching policy agreements about 
international negotiation positions. In terms of capacities, officials with experience of 
international diplomacy will need to be deployed and employed to essentially ‘ramp up’ this 
aspect of governmental activity:  
 
At a policy level it will be a ramping up of people to be able to operate at 
coastal state status, even if we're not the lead if Scotland is de facto leading 
in areas, we'll now have to start sending experienced, relatively senior 
people to RFMO [regional fisheries management organisation] meetings 
that we don’t normally go to, to countries that we've never been to before 
but all of a sudden we now have an interest.  
 (MS Interview B, 2018) 
 
Another interviewee made a similar point but added that an important policy strategy is also 
to conduct international negotiations through the EU once Britain leaves the EU given its 
policy clout resulting from UK involvement: 
 
We are still going to have international negotiations, we're going to have 
to establish ourselves as a new player and that comes some ways into the 
capacity side of things, you know, we are part of the negotiations, attend 
negotiations.  Scotland often takes quite a lead role but we're doing that in 
the context of the EU so there's quite a lot of learning to be done there, how 
to conduct yourself as a coastal state.   
    (MS Interview C, 2018) 
 
Similar themes emerge with other interviewees but with the point that there will also be 
demands put on scientists in Scotland and the UK given that Brexit will mean the need for 
direct engagement with scientific bodies: 
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We will need to fill that gap…We'll be running our own kind of coastal 
state operations so that would involve more manpower. Our scientists will 
have to represent UK in a number of scientific bodies, where before of 
course it was any EU scientist could represent the whole of the European 
Union so there will be a demand on that.    
     (MS Interview E, 2018) 
 
The point about linking with scientific bodies and NGOs is salient because the CFP 
essentially formalises objectives in the UNCLOS – an example being managing stocks 
towards MSY. In other words, inside or outside CFP, the Scottish government, regardless of 
devolution, is bound to abide by international treaties and the devolution settlement requires 
Scotland to operate as such.  Therefore, shaping international policy agendas in Scotland’s 
interest will require the need to build on relations with NGOs and fisheries organisations in 
an attempt to secure policy outcomes that are appropriate for Scotland as a non-EU coastal 
state (MS Interview B, 2018). 
 
For Scottish government, a key area of development required in terms of stakeholder/NGO 
engagement capacities is to ensure that the institutional structures in government allow for 
the creation of a flexible delegation structure suitable for both NGOs and government at 
different points in policy cycles. This requires stakeholder groups (such as the Scottish 
Fisherman’s Federation and other fishing associations) to be comfortable with having ‘twin 
identities’ (i.e. having both insider status and outsider status) depending on the policy 
context. This is by no means feasible nor necessarily desirable by stakeholders who will need 
to manage their own agendas carefully as representatives of their members: 
 
We've got to create a structure with industry around how do they, you know, 
they'll be a two tier thing, they'll be there, they'll be part of the delegation but 
they won't be in the heads of delegation, so you'll have some industry, then 
you'll have industry sitting outside again, you know, so there's quite a 
challenge around that…But I will need bodies.  
          (MS Interview B, 2018) 
 
This issue is compounded by tensions among industry representative groups themselves, 
who often hold divergent and competing interests. An interviewee (respondent E) outlined 
the fractural nature of relationships between the Scottish Fisherman’s Federation (SFF) 
(which represent large vessels) and the smaller inshore community given that the SFF view 
Brexit as an opportunity to increase catches, whereas smaller sections of industry tend to 
regard Brexit as leading to considerable economic uncertainty. However, the voices of the 
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latter have been ‘drowned out to some extent’. This highlights the inequalities that exist in 
the interest representation of the fisheries sector. 
 
While other non-EU coastal states (such as Norway and the Faroe Islands) have managed to 
develop good working relationships with industry, this is the result of long-standing relations 
between government and industry, reflecting strong levels of trust (Huggins et al, 2018; 
McAngus et al, 2018b). Trust-levels between the SFF and the SNP government in Scotland 
has been subject to considerable strain since the Brexit referendum due to the SNP’s position 
of wanting to remain a member of the EU. This has not been popular with the SFF due to 
their position that the CFP has impacted negatively on Scottish fishers and coastal 
communities (SFF, 2019). In this respect, the need to develop political/relational capacities 
also indicate a requirement for Scottish Government to review their communicative 
capacities for managing stakeholder expectations. This will be key to achieving the vision 
outlined by the official quoted above in securing a two-tier structure for stakeholder 
engagement as part of future governance arrangements. This capacity type involves the 
ability of government to communicate the implications of different policy options in order 
to manage stakeholder expectations. Managing expectations with industry and those working 
in the catching sector is an area of government business that will need to be continually 
developed. An official highlighted that there can be ‘naivety’ within the catching sector 
about what Brexit means (i.e. the idea that there will not be a sharing of stocks or other 
bilateral agreements with the EU and other non-EU coastal states post-Brexit):  
 
Some fishermen genuinely believe there will be no foreign fishing vessels and 
all that fish, 60%, you know, we've got the stats, we catch 40% of the fish that 
was available, 60% goes to foreigners, so a lot of them are thinking about new 
vessels or upgrading or wanting/looking to increase capacity because…they 
think the good days are about to arrive back… So there is on the part of some 
fishermen a naivety and an expectation which is very high. 
                (MS Interview E, 2018) 
 
Although a senior official suggested that ‘I think Scottish industry expectations are managed 
better than other parts of the UK’, there was a sense that blame games are ever present - ‘you 
know, it's always nice to be able to blame somebody else’ (MS Interview B, 2018).  From a 
capacities perspective the learning from this is that, in line with formulating re-designed 
structures with industry stakeholders, there will be a need to invest in communication 
mechanisms and processes to manage the expectations of the catching sector to avoid blames 
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games. The transition arrangement agreed by the UK with the EU as part of the Brexit 
negotiations (i.e. that the UK will be signed up to the CFP until at least 2020) provides a 
strong indication that administrations across the UK will need to evaluate their capacities to 
communicate a message of incrementalism about how the outcomes of Brexit will unfold. 
This includes what fishing agreements will mean for fishers in the context of continuing to 
accommodate international obligations. Interviewee B noted that over time the opportunities 
to increase catches are likely to increase but this will be over a period of years and it will be 
a negotiated process, thus there is a need for fishers to avoid having a ‘a lack of realism’. 
 
The management of industry expectations is not only about matters concerning access to 
waters and quotas, there is the added dimension of Brexit presenting opportunities to refocus 
fisheries governance in Scotland towards community-based fisheries:   
 
 I think also the community inshore folk are seeing Brexit as an opportunity for 
us to put communities at the head of policy as well. So their expectations are 
that there’ll be a huge change in our policy direction towards more community 
based fisheries… We will have a management of expectations and there’ll be a 
political expectation I think as well. 
 (MS Interview D, 2018)  
 
 
Overall, Table 1 summarises the capacity areas where there are higher levels of capacity for 
accommodating the rescaling of competences for fisheries governance (absorbable); areas 
where there is more of a dynamic at play in terms of medium-high levels of absorption within 
a capacity area (mixed); and where there are low levels of capacity (deficits).  
 
Table 1: Capacity types  
 
[insert Table 1] 
 
 
Conclusion  
This study has shown how capacities are vitally important to the architecture of post-Brexit 
governance, and the variability of the level capacity absorption is acutely important for 
policy planning.  What is also clear from this research is that, conceptually, political and 
communicative capacity types are inextricably linked.  The study develops, empirically, 
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what El-Taliawi and Van Der Wal (2019: 11) have recently concluded by reviewing the 
work of others – that ‘administrative capacity intertwines and interplays with other capacity 
dimensions, including policy and state capacity, components should not be addressed 
individually or in isolation’. By focusing on the applied aspects of capacity and 
implementation, our study has found that Marine Scotland’s capacity to cope with the 
outcomes of Brexit is uneven.  In some ways, Marine Scotland is well placed to cope with 
the additional pressures that leaving the CFP will bring.  The organisation has a long history 
of fisheries management and has a strong bureaucratic core upon which capacity can be built 
without requiring significant reform.  Capacities regarding the organisation’s networking 
capabilities, for example, are well embedded. There exists a good basis upon which to build. 
However, extra capacity when it comes to scientific monitoring and the policing of IUU 
vessels are examples of areas where extra capacity, particularly in terms of staffing, will be 
needed.  The analytical framework that has been applied to assess these capacities has helped 
to identify the types of capacity required.  For political capacities, for example, there are 
aspects of this capacity type where capacity is sorely needed, whereas in others far less so.  
 
Broader learning from this study is that constitutional arrangements are acutely important 
for when examining the deficiencies (or otherwise) in governance capacities. Scotland 
elucidates a case whereby the elements of devolved public policy tend to be absorbable but 
the skills and organisational readiness for understanding policy engagement with 
stakeholders around international negotiations (political capacities) require careful 
evaluation and investment. From the point of view of policy-makers, ensuring that political 
capacities are in place is key given that the impetus to increase (be it fine-tuning or further) 
other governance capacities falls from this dimension.  This study finds that despite that the 
legacy of being part of the CFP for over four decades will continue to affect decision-making 
and governance.  Leaving the CFP does not represent ‘day zero’ – our empirical evidence 
suggests a ‘Scottish’ approach to fisheries management, separate from the CFP, will be an 
incremental process.  Interconnectedness with the EU, as well as the path dependent nature 
of policy decisions, means that leaving the CFP will not necessarily be the radical overhaul 
that many in the catching sector expect, at least not in the short-term. 
 
The Brexit process has produced a number of machinations and uncertainties but what is 
clear is that the governance of fisheries is one area that will be held up by the British 
government, symbolically and practically, as a public policy that represents the UK being a 
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‘third country’ outside the jurisdiction of the CFP. We have highlighted that under the 
devolution settlement, alongside the UK government’s commitment to common 
frameworks, there will be areas of capacities that require development by authorities.  The 
case of Scotland provides evidence that many aspects of fisheries governance are absorbable 
and these tend to be areas concerning fisheries management and of an operational and 
analytical nature. This is because the foundational bureaucratic infrastructure is in place, 
which is a reflection of the long-standing devolution of fisheries management.  Dissimilar 
to these areas of capacity are those that will require greater capacity and investment at more 
of a political, communicative and relational level (these areas are more exposed capacity 
areas). More broadly, we call for a research agenda for the analysis of governance capacities 
in order to understand the implications of policy authority shifting back from the EU. In 
terms of future research, capacity-focused research should consider the changing 
mechanisms and institutional regimes of governance when making connections with debates 
about the ‘processes of European disintegration’ (Rosamond, 2016). 
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